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INTRODUCTION

An observation by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York
State Court of Appeals invites response. As part of Judge Kaye's Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice, she
suggested a substantially different approach between state and federal
courts to statutory interpretation:
Despite the outpouring of scholarly ink, analysis has focused
almost entirely on how federal courts read federal statutes. Few,
if any, of the recent commentators have considered whether the
subject of statutory interpretation presents a different set of issues for state judges reading state statutes.
I submit that it does. And of the many reasons that come to
mind, perhaps most important, as is evident in the area of state
constitutional law, is the fact that state courts regularly, openly,
and legitimately speak the language of the common law
whereas federal courts do not.'
To "speak the language of the common law"2 is, to Judge Kaye, to
speak the language of "lawmaking and policymaking by judges."3 Such
speaking does not trump statutory law, for, as Judge Kaye has acknowledged: Statutory lawmaking "has ... surpassed [the common law] as
the preeminent source of law it once was,"4 and "[u]nless a statute in
some way contravenes the state or federal constitution, we are obliged
to follow it-and of course we do."5 Rather, Judge Kaye's impressment
of the common law is "to fill the 'gaps' inevitably arising from the
complex interplay between human facts and abstract laws, and to fill the
far deeper void that would result if state courts were to abrogate their
traditional role as interstitial lawmakers."6 This common law approach
is progressive. According to Judge Kaye it "is not static. It proceeds and

1. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions,70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
2. Id. at 20.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 18.
5. Id. at 26.
6. Id. at 11; see, e.g., People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 733, 735 (N.Y. 1998) (applying
"interstitial common-law adjudication" to establish standing to challenge the use of pen registers
and trace and trap devices in criminal investigations).
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grows incrementally, in restrained and principled fashion, to fit into a
changing society. 7
Understood in this way-using the common law to fill in statutory
gaps-Judge Kaye's view of this approach to statutory interpretation is,
I think, both right and wrong. It is right because state courts generally
employ this approach, New York doing so with great frequency, particularly because of the chronic absence of any legislative record from
which to draw clues of statutory meaning. Her view is only wrong in her
limitation of its reach to state courts. As Judge Abner J. Mikva and I
have written: "[A]pproaches to statutory interpretation are not divisible
into 'state' and 'federal.' Differences in interpretive approaches are the
product of individual judicial sensibilities and not, for the most part,
particular jurisdictions."' The use of a common law approach as defined
by Judge Kaye is what judges must do and do to make a decision. "Must
do" because the judicial role is to decide cases and "do" because, in the
words of Judge Mikva, as cited by Judge Kaye, this "'is really judicial
'naturalism'-judges doing what comes naturally."' 9
From this perspective federal judges are not different from state
judges. They must decide the case before them. They are required to
follow legislative dictates. They have views about the legislative process. They have general policy preferences and form outcome preferences in particular cases. Whether a judge will impose his or her own
conscious preference in a particular case depends upon a number of
factors, including the clarity of the statute's command in the particular
case, the intensity of the preference, and his or her sense of obligation to
obey statutory commands. Furthermore, if a statute is unclear and the
road to its meaning unmapped, federal judges also will apply common
law techniques. Judge Robert Cowen (then of the Third Circuit), on his
federal judicial experience in searching for the meaning of unmapped
statutes, makes this point clearly: "I think I have to be brutally honest

7. Kaye, supra note 1, at 5 (footnote omitted). Compare this approach to common law approaches intended to limit statutory reach through, for example, canons of construction such as
"statutes in derogation of the common law should be read narrowly," or through modem normatively conservative canons such as Judge Easterbrook's that questions not expressly resolved by
statutes ought to be held "outside the statute's domain [and] ....remitted to whatever other
sources of law might be applicable." Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
533, 544 (1983).
8. ABNER J. MIKvA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PRocEss 3-4 (1997) [hereinafter MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION].

9. Kaye, supra note 1, at 10 (quoting Abner J. Mikva, Statutory Interpretation:Getting the
Law to Be Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 979 (1990)).
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with you and say the unspeakable, that I would decide the case based on
what I perceive the most just manner of resolving the matter before
me.", 1
Nevertheless, based on the two terms of New York Court of Appeals cases I have reviewed (1998 and 1999), there are several interesting, and perhaps unique aspects to New York's approach to statutory
construction that deserve note. First, the New York Court of Appeals
seems broadly committed to statutory text as the touchstone of interpretation." Despite the ambiguity that usually surrounds any case that arrives at the highest judicial level, a surprisingly high number of these
cases are, and seem properly, answered by reference to the text itself.
Second, the Court of Appeals often appears uncomfortable with simply
applying the clear text alone, reaching for what it characterizes as legislative history for support of its already announced clear statutory reading. 2 Third, the New York Court of Appeals seems to have recognized
the frailties of judicial canons and steered away from their use as determinative sources of legislative meaning, except in situations when
the use of particularly sensible canons seems appropriate. 3 This is particularly surprising given the poverty of New York's legislative enactment record for almost any bill. Fourth, despite this dearth of legislative
history, the court frequently makes reference to what it characterizes as
legislative history, but defines the term broadly to include an array of
executive documents that, from a more traditional perspective, are of
questionable virtue." This definition of legislative history shifts legislative power to the executive branch of government, but this is a consequence of the New York Legislature's own decision to conduct business
in a largely unrecorded manner. Fifth, notwithstanding this overly inclusive definition of legislative history, the court confronts a large number of "show down" cases" in which common law approaches must be
applied.' 6 Sixth, and finally, despite the potential for a politicized court
absent the discipline imposed by a legislative record, there is a remark-

10. Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual District Court Conference of the Association of
the Federal Bar of the State of New Jersey (Mar. 13, 1997) (on file with the HofstraLaw Review).
11. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 155-83 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 184-222 and accompanying text.
15. "Show down" cases are those in which a court is asked to answer a statutory question
with no real probative clue as to what the enacting legislature intended. See infra notes 223-24 and
accompanying text.
16. See infranotes 223-47 and accompanying text.
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able level of unanimity over decisions involving statutes. 7 This is particularly noticeable when compared to the Supreme Court which often
appears far more legislative than judicial. It is on the above points that
this Article will focus.
II. How JUDGES INTERPRET STATUTES
New York's and all judicial approaches to statutory interpretation
are framed by the constitutional truism that the judicial will must bend
to the legislative command. 8 Such legislative superiority means that, in
the application of statutes, judges are not free to resolve a dispute by
simply imposing their outcome preferences, as they might have done in
a common law setting, or to treat statutory laws as loosely binding
precedents, as they may have treated common law precedents. In
"question[s] of statutory interpretation ... the Court's role is clear: our
purpose is not to pass on the wisdom of the statute or any of its requirements, but rather to implement the will of the Legislature as expressed in its enactment."' 9 Or, to reiterate Judge Kaye's observation:
"Unless a statute in some way contravenes the state or federal constitution, we are obliged to follow it-and of course we do."' It is through
the subordination of the judiciary to
2 the legislature that our laws are assured their "democratic pedigree.", 1
To "follow" (using the words of Judge Kaye) a statute, a court
must determine its meaning in the context of the particular case before
it. If the particular text answers the question the inquiry usually ends
because, as discussed below, the language of a statute is the best evidence of the legislative will.' "The Court's threshold inquiry in this regard is how to discern the legislative intent. When an enactment displays a plain meaning, the courts construe the legislatively chosen

17. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
18. As Judge Posner has written, a statute is "a command issued by a superior body (the
legislature) to a subordinate body (the judiciary)." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURiSPRUDENCE 265 (1990).
19. People v. Ryan, 626 N.E.2d 51, 54 (N.Y. 1993); see also Mowczan v. Bacon, 703
N.E.2d 242, 244 (N.Y. 1998) (quoting Matter of Scotto v. Dinkins, 647 N.E.2d 1317, 1319 (N.Y.
1995) (quoting Matter of Sutka v. Conners, 538 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 1989))) ("'In matters of
statutory construction ... the 'proper judicial function is to "discern and apply the will of the
Legislature..""); supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
20. Kaye, supra note 1, at 26.
21. See CASS R. SUNsTEiN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 112-113 (1990).
22. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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words so as to give effect to that Branch's utterance. ' This, of course,
is the plain meaning rule.
When a statute is unclear with respect to a particular question, lawyers and courts generally commence their search for statutory meaning
by asking the question: Did the legislature intend this particular statutory provision to cover this particular fact pattern? In such cases, courts
find the answer by reference to additional sources such as other statutory provisions (statutory context), legislative history, and canons of
construction. 24 Two New York cases, both decided in 1998, Fumarelli v.
Marsam Development, Inc.5 and Mowczan v. Bacon,26 illustrate this
point. In Fumarelli,confronted with an unclear statute and the question
of whether it replaced a common law remedy, the court wrote:
[W]e acknowledge that the enactment does not explicitly utter a
legislative direction .... To answer the question, therefore ...
the Court must now look beyond the language of the statute.
Our preeminent responsibility in that endeavor is to search for
and effectuate the Legislature's purpose. In this respect, legislative history and the events associated with and occasioning the
passage of the particular statute are valuable guiding lights.1
And in Mowczan, in answering the question of whether contribution was
permissible under an unclear provision of the State's Vehicle and Traffic Law, the court stated: "'In matters of statutory construction,
'legislative intent is "the great and controlling principle"'
'Generally, inquiry must be made of the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history.""
Note the reference above to both legislative intent and purpose as
the point of reference in the search for meaning. Historically, reference
by the courts to legislative intent has been the subject of intense critical
analysis. 9 Such criticism argued that judges frequently used legislative

23. Brown v. Wing, 93 N.Y.2d 517, 522 (1999).
24. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (1999) (statutory context); Argentina v. Emery World Wide Delivery Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 554, 562 (1999) (same); Foley
v. Bratton, 709 N.E.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. 1999) (same); People v. Romero, 698 N.E.2d 424, 427-28
(N.Y. 1998) (legislative history); Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist., 696 N.E.2d 978,
980 (N.Y. 1998) (canons of construction).
25. 703 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 1998).
26. 703 N.E.2d 242 (N.Y. 1998).
27. Fumarelli,703 N.E.2d at 254 (citations omitted).
28. Moivczan, 703 N.E.2d at 244 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
29. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 7.
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intent to trump statutory language the judges disfavored. 0 In other
words, if they did not like the outcome effected by the statutory language, they would declare that a favored outcome was required by legislative intent.' The denial of legislative intent as a reference point for
statutory interpretation left its critics with somewhat of a problem. If
reference could not be made to legislative intent, on what basis would a
court be able to find the meaning of an unclear statute? Or, for some
proponents of broader judicial discretion, on what basis would a court
be able to exercise discretion beyond the language of a statute? After
all, when interpreting a statute, courts still needed to find some legislative peg on which to hang their decision. The response was to refer to a
statute's "purpose," which was seen by its proponents as a more objec-32
tive standard that "is evident [from] ...the thing (the statute) itself."
In the words of Professors Hart and Sacks: "Purpose," to its proponents,
is found by "comparing the new law with the old" and asking "[w]hy
would reasonable men, confronted with the law as it was, have enacted
this new law to replace it? '33 Whether or not there is a real distinction
between legislative "intent" and "purpose," as is evidenced by the New
York Court of Appeals, courts have basically ignored this theoretical
debate in their pragmatic search for statutory meaning.34 Courts, in fact,
for the most part, use "intent" unanalytically and interchangeably with
"purpose" to refer to a source of statutory meaning (the intent of the
legislature, or the purpose of the legislation) outside of the language of
the statute at issue in the litigation.35
Sometimes even when the language is clear, the court and advocates will question whether the legislature could have intended or meant
the result brought about by the application of the language. This is because language always has context and its clear application in one setting may not be so clear in another; "[m]eaning depends on context as
well as on the semantic and other formal properties of sentences., 36 Re30. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
30 (1997).
31. See Max Radin, StatutoryInterpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 881 (1930).
32. Id. at 875.
33. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPuCATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eslridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
34. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing two recent New York cases,
Fumarelli v. Marsam Development, Inc., 703 N.E.2d 251, 254-55 (N.Y. 1998), and Mowczan v.
Bacon, 703 N.E.2d 242, 244 (N.Y. 1998), that use legislative intent and purpose as reference
points for statutory meaning).
35. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 8.
36. POSNER, supranote 18, at 269.
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fusing to grapple with this phenomenon can result in a form of hyper-

textualism that in fact can drain a statute of its meaning.37 New York jurisprudence appears to acknowledge this problem:
In giving effect to these words, "the spirit and purpose of the act
and the objects to be accomplished must be considered. The
legislative intent is the great and controlling principle. Literal
meanings of words are not to be adhered to or suffered to
'defeat the 3general purpose and manifest policy intended to be
promoted."

Of course, such an approach also allows a court to avoid the unfavorable
policy consequence of a statute with which the court disagrees. 9 Such
judicial activism does not seem to demark the cases reviewed for this
Article.
I.

WHEN THE TEXT PROVIDES A PLAIN MEANING

The starting point, at least theoretically, for any interpretive effort
is the text of the statute in question. It is the text that a legislature en-

acts, and only through such an enactment can that law be legislatively
made. The New York Court of Appeals often reiterates this constitutional truism. "When ...a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts are
obligated to construe the statute so as to give effect to the plain meaning

of the words." And, more importantly, the court quite often applies it.
During 1998 and 1999, the court, using the plain meaning rule decided,
for example, Amabile v. City of Buffalo,1 Caselnova v. New York State
Department of Health,42 Mennella v. Lopez-Torres,43 People v. Stirrup,44
37. See Smith v. UnitedStates, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), in which Justice Scalia dissented arguing that "[tihe Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and
how it ordinarilyis used." Id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. Council of N.Y. v. Giuliani, 710 N.E.2d 255, 259 (N.Y. 1999) (quoting People v. Ryan,
8 N.E.2d 313, 315 (N.Y. 1937)).
39. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-04 (1979) (using
legislative history to reverse the Fifth Circuit and hold that race conscious affirmative action programs constitute employment discrimination and violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of
1964). For a discussion of the case in this context see MiKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRErATION, supra note 8, at 14-16.
40. Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 244, 246 (N.Y. 1999).
41. 93 N.Y.2d 471, 476 (1999) ("The Legislature has made plain its judgment that the municipality should be protected from liability ....
").
42. 694 N.E.2d 1320, 1322 (N.Y. 1998) (declaring that the plain meaning of "probation"
includes "some condition which the party on probation must fulfill").
43. 695 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1998) (explaining that plain meaning prohibits Civil Court
judges from adding procedural steps to the state's statutory eviction process).
44. 694 N.E.2d 434, 436-37 (N.Y. 1998) (noting that plain meaning dictates the date for
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People v. Stevens,4 and People v. Chavis." In Gonzalez v. Iocovello,47
the court admonished the losing party explaining that, in the face of a
clear statutory provision, it had chosen the wrong forum for its challenge.4 8 "[B]ut these importunings for implied preclusion against fellow
officer lawsuits are more appropriately addressed to the Legislature, especially in view of its unqualified enactment language and the legislative history [of the statute.]' ' 9
As part of its deference to the plain meaning rule, the court on occasion engages in a dispute over what constitutes plain meaning in a
particular case. An example is People v. Owusu.5 In Owusu, a case in
which, among other things, a victim's finger had been bitten to the
bone, the question was whether teeth constituted a "dangerous instrument" under provisions of the state penal law which made the use of a
dangerous instrument in the commission of a crime a separately chargeable offense.5 ' The majority found that teeth did not constitute an
"instrument" because "[t]he 'plain' words of the statute have consistently been understood by this Court ...and the Legislature to mean
that an instrument is not one's arm, hand, teeth, elbow or any other body
part." 2 In response to a blistering dissent accusing the majority of
"nothing less than the functional equivalent of judicial legislation"53 and
illogic, the majority simply replied: "We do not reject the principle that
the words of [the] statute[] are the primary indicia of their meaning; we
simply do not accept the dissenter's view of the plain meaning of the
term 'instrument."'"M
While the jurisprudential evidence supports Judge Kaye's claim of
fealty to express statutory terms, the court, in its application of a statute's clear language, will also turn to what it characterizes as legislative
history to support its view. In doing so the court seems to support a

commencing the calculation for speedy trial purposes).
45. 692 N.E.2d 985, 989 (N.Y. 1998) (arguing that a "[c]ourt may 'not resort to interpretative contrivances to broaden the scope and application' of unambiguous statutes").
46. 695 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (N.Y. 1998) (explaining that the People's "argument runs
counter to the express words of the statute"). For additional plain meaning cases see Global Fin.
Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 525 (1999); In re Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 531 (1999); Montella
v. Bratton, 93 N.Y.2d 424 (1999).
47. 93 N.Y.2d 539 (1999).

48. See id. at 549-50.
49. Id.
50. 712 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1999).

51. See id. at 1229.
52. Id. at 1233.
53. Id. at 1234 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).

54. Id. at 1233.
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modified plain meaning rule described by Judge Patricia M. Wald of the

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals as follows:
[A]lthough the Court still refers to the "plain meaning" rule, the
rule has effectively been laid to rest. No occasion for statutory
construction now exists when the Court will not look at the legislative history. When the plain meaning rhetoric is invoked, it
becomes a device not for ignoring legislative history but for
shifting onto legislative history the burden of proving that the
words do not mean what they appear to say."'

Examples abound. The best statement of this approach is found in
Council of New York v. Giuliani,6 in which the court held that "the
statutory language, amply buttressed by the legislative history, supports
the result."'57

Several problems arise from such use of legislative history. First,
giving weight to legislative history in the face of a clear textual answer
diminishes the theoretical, constitutional, and real significance of the
bicameral vote on the text and its presentment to the executive. It is the
text, after all, that is the central object of the enactment process. Second,
such use of the text suggests that text and legislative history are interchangeable, draining certainty from law, creating more opportunities to
argue that a statute is unclear because of contradictions between text
and legislative history, and enhancing judicial power. 8 The Court of
55. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195 (1982) (footnote omitted).
56. 710 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1999); see People v. Feerick, 93 N.Y.2d 433, 446 (1999); Owusu,
712 N.E.2d at 1231; Karlin v. IVF Am., Inc., 712 N.E.2d 662, 666 (N.Y. 1999); People v. Wilder,
93 N.Y.2d 352, 358-59 (1999); Dorosz v. Green & Seifter, 708 N.E.2d 162, 165 (N.Y. 1999);
People v. Stirrup, 694 N.E.2d 434, 436 (N.Y. 1998); Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr. v. Maul, 693
N.E.2d 200, 203-04 (N.Y. 1998).
57. Giuliani, 710 N.E.2d at 260. Despite this statement, the court also used the purpose
clause of the statute in question to resolve the dispute. See id. at 259; infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
58. For a unique case in which the Supreme Court used legislative history to trump clear
statutory language see Train v. ColoradoPublic Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
In this case, the Court of Appeals stated: "In our view, then, the statute is plain and unambiguous
and should be given its obvious meaning. Such being the case ....we need not here concern ourselves with the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments." Colorado Pub. Interest Research
Group, Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d 743, 748 (10th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court, in reversing the
Court of Appeals, replied:
To the extent that the Court of Appeals excluded reference to the legislative history of
the [statute] in discerning its meaning, the court was in error. As we have noted before:
"When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words
may appear on 'superficial examination."'
Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976) (quoting United
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Appeals seems to have rejected such an argument in Brown v. Wing."
There, in response to a proffer of legislative history arguably contradicting the text, the court stated that "[wihile we do not find the language
ambiguous, we note that the proffered information does not, in any
event, support petitioners' theory."' Third, the more emphasis on legislative history, the more parties will attempt to "create" such "history" in
an attempt to influence the courts. In New York, an additional problem
arises from this modified plain meaning rule. As there is little probative
legislative history, emphasis on what is characterized as legislative history usually equates to an emphasis on executive-legislative history, that
is, comments on a bill collected by the executive prior to the bill's
signing.62 One example of this is Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady,63 in which the court, after determining that the plain meaning of a
statutory provision protected police personnel records from Freedom of
Information requests, added that this view was supported by memoranda
from the Division of Budget, the Division of State Police, the Police
Conference and a special local prosecutor, as well as two legislative
memoranda s
The use of the post facto lobbying efforts of governmental and
non-governmental parties to inform judicial interpretive decisions, let
alone one based on a clear text, is problematic whether or not the court
actually is influenced by such documents. Perhaps aware of this, the
65 discourt, in Majewski v. Broadalbin-PerthCentral School District,
cussed later in this Article,' implicitly raised questions about its own

States v. American Trucking Assn's, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).
59. 93 N.Y.2d 517 (1999).
60. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
61. As stated by M. Douglass Bellis, Assistant Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, at the 1996 American Association of Law Professors' annual conference: "'If we decide
that the legislative history ... is more important than the legislation, legislators will never really
know what they have to do, what levers they need to pull in order to get their ideas finmly cemented in place."' MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 33 (alteration
in original).
62. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
63. 710 N.E.2d 1072 (N.Y. 1999). In People v. Wilder 93 N.Y.2d 352 (1999), the plain
meaning of the statute clearly answered the question of whether a bail jumper was subject to first
or second degree ball jumping, but the court felt it necessary to garnish the decision with a memo
from the New York State Law Enforcement Council. See id. at 358-59. The New York State Law
Enforcement Council is a lobbying group composed of the State's leading law enforcement officials. See Martin Fox, Criminal Court Reforms Suggested by State Law Enforcement Council,
N.Y. LJ., May 31, 1999, at 1.
64. See Daily Gazette Co., 710 N.E.2d at 1075-76.
65. 696 N.E.2d 978 (N.Y. 1998).
66. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
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practices. 67 In addition, in Brown v. Wing,6' the court suggested that, if
legislative history was contrary to a statute's clear meaning, the statutory text would prevail.69
IV. SOME EXCEPTIONS TO THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
A. Absurdity
As the goal of statutory interpretation is discerning the legislative
intent, sometimes, even when the language is clear regarding a particular case, courts will resist its application. 0 As noted earlier, this resistance is based on a view that the legislature could not have meant to
apply the statute in this particular case.7 For example, as Professor
Daniel Farber has written, "virtually no one doubts the correctness of
the ancient decision that a statute prohibiting 'letting blood in the
streets' did not ban emergency surgery."'72 This means that even when
statutory language is clear, a question may arise about its applicability
to a particular fact pattern. Usually that question is cast as whether the
enacting legislature could have intended such an absurd result.73 Judge
Kaye has described this doctrine as applicable in situations in which the
application of a statute's clear language would lead to an absurd conclusion.74 And the court has written that if the words of a statute are
clear "there is no room for construction" unless the "definite meaning"
involves an absurdity.75 In practice, once in a while the application of
this doctrine makes sense. A case cited by Judge Kaye in her article falls
within such a category.7 6 In In re George L.,7 the court held that while
the statute was clear, interpreting "currently" in the strictest sense would
lead to an absurd conclusion.78

67. See Majewski, 696 N.E.2d at 980.
68. 93 N.Y.2d 517 (1999).
69. See id. at 522.
70. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 6.

71. See supranotes 36-39 and accompanying text.
72. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281,

289 (1989).
73. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supranote 8, at 6-7.
74. See Kaye, supra note 1, at 26.

75. Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist., 696 N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y. 1998) (citing
Tompkins v. Hunter, 43 N.E. 532,534 (N.Y. 1896)).
76. See Kaye, supra note 1,at 26 n.146.
77. 648 N.E.2d 475 (N.Y. 1995).
78. See id. at 479.
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More often, judicial resort to this theory reflects a determined judicial effort to effect a disfavored legislative policy in a particular case.
One well known Supreme Court decision makes this point. In Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States,7'9 the majority simply could not believe
that Congress had intended to punish a church for importing an English
pastor, despite a statutory provision that prohibited anyone from bringing foreigners to the United States "to perform labor or service of any
kind" except, among others, foreigners who were "professional actors,
artists, lecturers, [or] singers."'
Regarding the doctrine of absurdity, Judge Kaye offers an unnecessary justification for its application. She writes:
No one can question the legislature's authority to correct or redirect a state court's interpretation of a statute. Indeed, on our
court we especially strive for consensus in statutory interpretation cases as a matter of policy, knowing that the legislature always can, and will, step in if it feels we have gotten it wrong.8'
If the application of the doctrine is to avoid actual statutory absurdity, it
needs no defense, but if it is to justify judicial policymaking it should
not be used. The fact that a subsequent legislature can and may overturn
a judicial ruling, while perhaps comforting, should not be the basis for
judicial lawmaking. In fact, it reverses the constitutional premise of
legislature as lawmaker and judiciary as interpreter by placing subsequent legislative bodies in the role of interpreter. Also, such an approach misunderstands the legislative process. The fact that a legislative
body can change a judicial decision does not mean that it will, and
whether it will or not depends upon many more factors than simply
whether members of the legislature or a majority of the legislature disagree with that decision. A legislature's decision to reverse a judicial
decision is not simply a matter of its disapproval of that decision. Much
more is needed. For a legislature to reverse a judicial decision, it must
79. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In examining the Court's decision in Church of the Holy Trinity,
Professor Philip P. Frickey has written:
In my legislation course, I tell my students that Holy Trinity Church is the case you always cite when the statutory text is hopelessly against you ....The tactic of relying
upon the case does sometimes resemble the "hail Mary" pass in football. As a matter of
attorney advocacy, that may be all well and good, but as a matter of judicial resolution
of a critical social issue, it may seem like something altogether different.
Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation,77 MINN. L. REV. 241,247 (1992).
80. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458. For a discussion of this case see ABNER J. MiKVA & ERIC
LANE,LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 828-33 (1995) [hereinafter MIKVA & LANE,LEGISLATIvE PROCESS].
81. Kaye, supra note 1,at 23 (footnote omitted).
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also conclude that doing so is more important both from policy and political perspectives than whatever is then commanding its resources and
time.s" Finally, such an approach can lead to the ill conceived canon that
a legislature's silence concerning a judicial decision confirms that decision. This is as inaccurate a presumption about the legislative process as
can be imagined.
B. Statutory Mistakes
Another instance in which courts are tempted to avoid the application of a statute's plain meaning is when they believe the plain meaning
is the result of a drafting error.s3 Often these cases revolve around questions of punctuation, but may also include other types of errors. The
court's task at that point is to decide whether they should provide a correction, despite the statute's clear meaning." A recent Supreme Court
decision, United States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.,86 demonstrates the typical approach used
when the question is one of punctuation. In that case a bank's right to
sell insurance in certain circumstances was challenged on the basis of a
statute which seemed to prohibit such bank activity." The question for
the Court was the location of certain quotation marks which, if read as
placed, would have barred the bank from selling insurance.88 In disregarding the punctuation the Court held:
A statute's plain meaning must be enforced, of course, and
the meaning of a statute will typically heed the commands of its
punctuation. But a purported plain-meaning analysis based only
on punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs the risk of
distorting a statute's true meaning.
Here, though the deployment of quotation marks ... points
in one direction, all of the other evidence from the statute points
82. For a discussion of the history of Congress reversing the Supreme Court see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331

(1991).
83. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supranote 8, at 18.
84. See id.
85. See id. For a general discussion of statutory mistakes, see John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1996).
86. 508 U.S. 439 (1993). For a discussion of United States NationalBank of Oregon v. Independent InsuranceAgents of Am., Inc., see MIKVA & LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note
80, at 874-84.
87. See IndependentInsurance, 508 U.S. at 441-42 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1952)).
88. See id. at 454.
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the other way. It points so certainly, in our view, as to allow
only the conclusion that the punctuation marks were misplaced. s9
Sometimes errors other than punctuation are alleged to have occurred.
When this occurs courts are generally more circumspect in their approach. Two questions arise: Has there actually been a mistake? and Is
the correction evident? In Harrisv. Shanahan," for example, the Kansas
Supreme Court was asked to invalidate a legislative districting statute
that failed to include a particular Kansas city in any state senate district.9 Each house of the legislature had passed a bill that had included
the missing city within the same legislative district, but the enrollment
clerk erroneously dropped this placement.' The court declined to add
the city to the allotted senate district because the bill presented to and
signed by the governor, omitting the city, was different from the bill,
including the city, that passed both houses.93 The court suggested that it
might have reached a different decision if the bill that passed the legislature was identical to the one signed by the governor, but still omitted the
particular city."' In that case, a statute would have actually been enacted. 9 According to the Kansas court: "[W]ords may be supplied in a
statute ... where omission is due to inadvertence, mistake, accident or
clerical error."" Although in 1998 and 1999, no New York Court of Appeals' decisions addressed statutory errors, New York's approach appears similar to that described above. A good example is Branford
House, Inc. v. Michetti.97 In response to a claim that the word "state," in
a statute that exempted housing projects with "state loans" from certain
costly requirements, was inserted by error, the court wrote:
Generally, a court may not assume the existence of legislative error and change the plain language of a statute to make it
conform to an alleged intent. However, a court may apply a
statute by disregarding a clerical error in legislation so as to
make the corrected statute conform to the Legislature's true in89. Id. at 454,455.
90. 387 P.2d 771 (Kan. 1963).
91. See id.at 778.
92. See id. at 781. An enrollment clerk performs the ministerial function of preparing the
final form of the bill, as both houses have agreed to it, for presentation to the executive. See
Eugene Gressman, Is the Item Veto Constitutional?,64 N.C. L. REV. 819, 821 (1986).
93. See Harris,387 P.2d at 786.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 783.
97. 623 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y. 1993).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:85

tent, if it is established unquestionably that (1) the true legislative intent is contrary to the statutory language, and (2) the
mistake is due to inadvertence or clerical error."
C. PrivateRemedies
Cases dealing with private rights of actions are another category of
cases that often raise a challenge to the application of plain meaning.
These cases have involved two questions: whether the legislature intended a private cause of action (sometimes referred to as an implied
cause of action), notwithstanding statutory silence, and whether a court,
based on the common law practice of providing a remedy for a "wrong,"
should supply one.' The Supreme Court seems to have narrowed these
questions to one. "The question of the existence of a statutory cause of
action is, of course, one of statutory construction.... [O]ur task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action."' '
New York's jurisprudence suggests a similar approach. In Carrier
v. SalvationArmy, °1 a 1996 case, the court was asked to find an implicit
private right of action for residents of an adult care facility subject to
Department of Social Services supervision to seek the appointment of a
temporary receiver under Social Services Law section 460-d(5).'tO The
statute provided for the grant of equitable relief for violations of the
laws and regulations governing group homes upon petition by the Attorney General. 3 In deciding that the statute did not implicitly create a
private remedy, the court declared: "[P]laintiffs may seek such relief
'only if a legislative intent to create such a right of action is "fairly
implied" in the statutory provisions and their legislative history." 0 4
V.

UNCLEAR STATUTES

Most cases before the New York Court of Appeals do not call for
the application of clear statutes but instead call for finding the meaning
98. Id. at 13.
99. See MKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 16.

100. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (citations omitted). For a
further discussion of this topic see MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at
16-18.
101. 667 N.E.2d 328 (N.Y. 1996).
102. See id. at 328.

103. See id.
104. Id. at 329 (quoting Brian Hoxie's Painting Co. v. Cato-Meridian Cent. Seh. Dist., 556
N.E.2d 1087, 1089 (N.Y. 1990)).
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of statutes that are unclear in the context of the particular case. As Judge
Kaye has noted: "I would venture the guess that in nearly every statutory case that reaches a state's highest court, there exist at least two
plausible interpretations, each in some way supported by the text."' '°
Several factors account for this. As Judge Mikva and I have written
elsewhere: "First, words are not perfect symbols for the communication
of ideas and may be understood differently by different audiences. Second, and most importantly, while particular events may stimulate the
enactment of a statute, statutes are, for the most part, drafted in general
terms, addressing categories of conduct.""' This is particularly true of
the broad regulatory reforms that are part of this century's legislative
legacy, under which substantial interpretive responsibilities are granted
to administrative agencies.0 7
Finally, sometimes statutes are unclear as a result of legislative
compromises that are struck to secure votes for the enactment of a statute."3 Such compromises can result in the use of undefined general
terms or legislative silence.' °9 The structured judgment provisions of
New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules are one such example."0
Against the background of a crisis in the costs of malpractice insurance,
the legislature attempted throughout 1985 to fashion a solution to the
problem."' In general, the Democrats focused on the rights of plaintiffs
while the Republicans focused on the rights of defendants. As the session came to an end with no final solution in sight, intense negotiations
among legislative and executive staffs began. The goal of these negotiations was to arrive at a solution to the agreed upon problem. The
means of effecting this goal was to worry less about the clarity of some
provisions of the statute and more about whether certain language could
attract support. From a legislative perspective, this made perfect sense
because it would allow a bill to pass, although leave unclear the breadth
of the text. On the other hand, from a judicial perspective, the ambigui-

105. Kaye, supra note 1, at 28.
106. MiKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 20.
107. See infra notes 248-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial review of
administrative interpretive decisions.
108. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 20.
109. See id. at 20-21.
110. See Medical Malpractice Insurance-Comprehensive Reform Act, ch. 294, 1985 N.Y.
Sessions Laws 685 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections of McKinney's).
111. See Bryant v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 124, No. 137, 1999 WL
444342 at *3 (N.Y. July 1, 1999). The author served as council to the Senate minority during 1985
and was its representative to those negotiations. This section is based on the author's experience
during this time.
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ties that emerged from these negotiations have been, according to the
Court of Appeals: "[D]eservedly ... labeled 'circuitous,' 'vexing,' as
'every Judge's nightmare,' and 'at best... ambiguous [which] can lead
to inexplicable results.""'"
Finally, sometimes ambiguities are created by legislative "failure"
to consider the question which has become the subject of litigation.'
One such example of the problem is the statute under consideration in
Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Howard."4 The statute requires towns to
maintain bridges." 5 The question before the court was whether this
statute also obligated the town to maintain a structure characterized by
the town as a "culvert.""' 6 This characterization was based on another
unrelated provision of law that made a distinction between bridges and
culverts." 7 In the end, the court turned to the dictionary to support the
Village's contention of the town's obligation."'
Whatever the cause, when confronted with an unclear statute, the
role of either a federal or state court is to find its meaning for application in a particular case. In effect, a court must decide whether the particular behavior in question in the case before it is governed by the particular provision of the statute in question without clear direction from
the statute's language. To search for the collective legislative intent,
both state and federal courts have relied on references to other provisions of the particular statute in question (context), canons of construction, and legislative history. All are in effect presumptions about legislative meaning. Legislative bodies speak constitutionally and formally
through the text of a statute and any reference to a source other than the
text to determine its meaning is, in effect, a presumption about its
meaning drawn from another source.
A. Statutory Context
Often the best way to determine the meaning of a particular statutory provision is by reference to another provision of the same statutory
enactment." 9 As all of a statute's language is enacted, there is no con-

112. Id. at *3 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Bermeo v. Atakent, 241
A.D.2d 235, 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)).
113. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supranote 8, at 22.
114. 708 N.E.2d 988 (N.Y. 1999).
115. See id at 989.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 990-91.
119. See id. at990.
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cern about the referred to text not reflecting the legislature's meaning.
The only question is whether the reading of the two provisions together
reflects the meaning of the enacting legislature. One of the most frequently cited sections of a statute for this use is its purpose clause.'20 Not
all statutes contain purpose clauses. When used, they are intended to
provide the public with the broad reasoning behind the legislation."'
They also serve to provide interpreters with a screen through which the
meaning of the statute's other provisions can be seen.'2 A recent Supreme Court case provides an excellent example of the use of such a
clause. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,23 the Court used the purpose
and findings clause of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to
resolve the question of whether corrective measures should be considered in determining whether an individual was disabled under the Act.' 24
The New York Court of Appeals frequently turns to a statute's
purpose clause to find the meaning of another of its provisions. 12 One
example from the 1998 and 1999 terms is Council of New York v. Giuliani.'26 In this case, the question before the court was whether the New
York City Health and Hospital Corporation ("HHC") could sublease one
of its hospitals to a for-profit entity under a provision of the HHC 2' that
provided: "'[W]hereby the corporation shall operate the hospitals then
being operated by the city for the treatment of acute and chronic diseases.""' Depending primarily on the purpose clause of the statute (the
HHC "'should be created to provide such health and medical services
and ... that the.., operation of the [HIIC] ... is in all respects for the
benefit of the people of the state of New York and of the city of New

120. One caveat about purpose clauses. Despite their usefulness, they are sometimes difficult
to find if one is unfamiliar with New York State's sources of law. Purpose clauses do not appear in
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York because they are not codifiable. Sometimes they
will appear in a footnote in the Code. See e.g., N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1045-a & 1046,
(McKinney 1999) 1984 N.Y. Laws chs. 513-15. The best place to find purpose clauses is in
McKinney's Session Laws where the laws are published in the form in which they were enacted.
See Vehicle and Traffic Accident Prevention Courses, ch. 290, § 399-a, 1 N.Y. Session Laws 766,
766 (1998) (codified as N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 399-a (McKinney Supp. 1999)).
121. See MtKvA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRErATION, supra note 8, at 164.
122. See id. at 165.
123. 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999).
124. See id. at 2147, 2149.
125. See, e.g., Council of N.Y. v. Giuliani, 710 N.E.2d 255, 259 (N.Y. 1999); Argentina v.
Emery World Wide Delivery Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 554, 562-63 (1999).
126. 710 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1999).
127. See id. at 256.
128. Id. at 259 (quoting New York City Health and Hospital Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAw § 7386(1)(a) (McKinney 1979)).
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York, and is a state, city and public purpose"'),'29 the court held the
sublease ultra vires, determining
that "[t]he statutory mandate is mani1 30
fest and self-evident."
Sometimes it is not the purpose clause of a statute to which explanatory references are made, but to some other provision of a statute.
One such example is People v. Romero,13 1 where the court was asked to
determine whether the Attorney General had the power to criminally
prosecute for the unlawful practice of law under Judiciary Law section
476-a(1), under which the Attorney General was authorized to bring an
"action" against those so engaged. 132 Section 476-a(2) similarly empowered the state's bar associations. 33 As such empowerment of the bar associations "would be contrary to the fundamental principle that the
power to prosecute crimes is traditionally a power of the State as sovereign,"' 34 the court reasoned that the term "action" was restricted to
civil actions. 35 Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Iocovello,'36 the court found
that there was no fellow officer lawsuit block in a particular provision
of the General Municipal Law based on the inclusion of such a block in
a different provision of the same enactment, a provision that amended
the General Obligations Law. 37
Other provisions of existing law (not enacted with the provision in
question) also may be used by courts as a source of meaning for the
provision in question.3 3 For example, definitions in an earlier enacted
statute would no doubt be read to cover subsequently substantive provisions of such a statute if these definitions were not amended. The question, of course, is whether such a provision is intended to inform the
meaning of the provision in question. An example of a case in which the
court found that such a provision was not intended to inform the provision in question is the earlier noted Village of Chestnut Ridge v. How-

129. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting New York City Health and Hospital Corporation Act,
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 7382).
130. Id.
131. 698 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1998).
132. See id. at 425.
133. See id. at 426.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 426-27.
136. 93 N.Y.2d 539 (1999).
137. See id. at 549. Note that it does not necessarily matter that the provisions of the statute
contain amendments to different titles of state law. What is important is that they are enacted together in one law. Sometimes, even if provisions of the same enactment seem to inform each other,
they may not if a contrary legislative intent can be discerned.
138. See R. Randall Kelso, Statutory InterpretationDoctrine on the Modem Supreme Court
and FourDoctrinalApproaches to JudicialDecision-making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 50 (1997).
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3 In that case the question was whether a particular structure was a
ard.'
bridge or a culvert.'" A separately enacted provision of the Highway
Law, in which the town's maintenance obligations were established,
contained a definition of a culvert that, if applicable, would have carved
1 41
the structure in question from the town's maintenance responsibility.
According to the court, despite a canon of construction that sections of a
law should be read together and the ease with which the application of
that canon would have resolved the case, 1 42 such a reading of the law
might

have the unintended effect of shifting the preexisting allocation,
as between towns and villages, of responsibility for the care and
upkeep of bridges and culverts. In the absence of a signal from
the Legislature that it wishes to change the rules for determining
which municipalities are responsible ... we decline to employ
such a construction. 43
Two other cases from the 1998 and 1999 terms provide a contrast
to Howard. In People v. Carroll'" the court was faced with an ambiguity regarding the definition of a particular statutory phrase under which
1 45
a child's "stepmother" may or may not have had criminal liability.
"Because the Penal Law does not describe who constitutes a 'person legally charged with the care or custody of a child,' defining this term
falls to the courts."' 46 To define the phrase, the court turned to the Family Law.'47 While the Penal Law referenced the Family Law for the
definition of a number of its terms, it did not do so for the phrase in
question; but this, according to the court, was not a problem because the
Family Law did not contain such a term." The Family Law did, on the
other hand, contain a definition for "person legally responsible" which
the court read, along with other provisions of the Family Law, to cover

139. 708 N.E.2d 988 (N.Y. 1999); see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.

140. See id. at 989.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 990. For a discussion of canons of construction see infra notes 155-83 and accompanying text.
143. Howard, 708 N.E.2d at 990.
144. 93 N.Y.2d 564 (1999).
145. See id. at 567. The court put the term stepmother in quotes to indicate that the Appellant
was not the legal stepmother by marriage or adoption. See id. at 566.
146. Id. at 567.
147. See id. at 568 (noting that section 1012(g) of the Family Court Act uses the term "person
legally responsible").
148. See id.
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the stepmother in this case.'49 No aspect of the provision referred to was
part of the same enactment, nor was there any demonstration of explicit
legislative intent to link the provision. Instead the court relied on a
fuzzy purpose provision of the Penal Law, which provided that the Penal Law should be "'construed according to the fair import of [its] terms
to promote justice and effect the objects of the law"' to make the link.5
Similarly, in People v. Owusu,'5 l the court determined that teeth
were not a dangerous instrument partially because a subsequent legislature enacted a law that imposed criminal liability on an adult for intentionally causing physical injury to a child under seven. The court then
stated:
If a body part such as a hand were within the sweep of the Penal
Law definition of a dangerous instrument, however, there would
have been no need for the legislation.... Because the Legislature did not consider hands or other body parts to constitute
53
dangerous instruments, the new provision was necessary.
This use of the post enactment actions by legislatures must be
treated very delicately. First, a subsequent legislature is not the arbiter
of the meaning of a prior statute. It can amend it, but it cannot interpret
it in the judicial sense of that word. Second, there are other explanations
for the "new provision," including a legislative desire to make a political statement concerning child abuse regardless of any other statute, a
concern about the earlier statute's clarity, and finally, ignorance of the
earlier statute.

149. See id.
150. Id. at 567. Of course, the court could alternatively have relied on the "rule of lenity" to
limit the criminal statute's scope but the facts of the case-the stepmother stood-by while the father beat his child to death-compelled a different approach. See Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 427 (1985) ("Application of the rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide
fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the appropriate balance between the
legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability."); ScAuA, supra note 30, at
27 (explaining that the rule of lenity "says that any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the defendant").
151. 712 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1999).
152. See hL at 1230-31 & n.2.
153. Id. at 1230-31.
154. There is one instance in which subsequent legislative action, short of amendment, should
be judicially used. Assume that a jurisdiction's high court has interpreted a statute in a particular
fashion and subsequently the legislature reenacts that statute without change. It would seem that
under such a record a court could sensibly read the reenacted statute as incorporating its interpretation.
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B. Canons of Construction
Canons are judicially crafted maxims intended to limit judicial discretion by rooting interpretive decisions in a system of aged and shared
principles from which a judge may draw a "'correct,' unchallengeable
rule[] of 'how to read."" 5 Many of them are quite familiar; for example,
remedial statutes should be read broadly. 5 6 Their use has been held in
scholarly ill-repute for over a century. So consistently unfavorably has
their use been viewed that two contemporary scholars of statutory interpretation have written "almost everybody thinks [that] canons are
bunk."' 57
Two basic observations underlie this criticism of the use of canons.
First, canons are not a coherent, shared body of law from which correct
answers can be drawn. Second, viewed individually, many canons are

wrong.
As to the first criticism, it is clear that canons are a grab bag of
contradictory individual rules from which a judge can choose to support

155. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How StatutesAre to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 399 (1950). A classic expression of canonical sanctify follows:
Among all civilized nations, we have always seen, formed by the side of the sanctuary of the laws, and under the controlling [sic] guidance of judicial and legislative
wisdom, a fund of maxims, rules, and decisions or doctrine, which have been sifted by
the constant practice, and the collision, consequent upon judicial debates. These rules
and maxims have been incessantly increasing the store of wisdom and knowledge thus
acquired, until they have become the supplement of legislation in the establishment of
law, and are regarded as the highest attainment towards the perfection of human reason,
in the exposition of law.
The judicial power established to declare and apply the laws, needs, and is greatly
aided, by such a fund of rules and maxims. These maxims apply equally to all men.
They regard men in the aggregate, never as individuals. They are rules as proper to be
known to the legislator, as to the magistrate, though their duties are variant. The science
of the legislator, and his consequent duty, consists in searching in each case for principles most favorable to the common welfare; that of the judge, is to put these principles
in action; to extend them by a wise and thoughtful application to private assumptions;
and to study the spirit of the law, when perhaps, the letter destroys.
SIR FORTuNATUS DwARuus, KNT., A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES: THEIR RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION, AND THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF LEGISLATION AND OF JUDICIAL INTERPRE-

TATION 121 (Platt Potter, J., ed., 1885).
156. See, e.g., N.Y. STAT. § 321 (McKinney 1971) ('Generally, remedial statutes are liberally
construed to carry out the reforms intended and to promote justice."). In New York canons are
collected and published as part of New York's privately published code. They are found in
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 1, Statutes. See, e.g., id.; N.Y. STAT. § 95
(McKinney 1971). Their inclusion within the Consolidated Laws is confusing. They are not legislatively enacted rules of interpretation despite their location.
157. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRiCKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 639 (1988); see MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supranote 8, at 25.
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his or her view of the case. This was Karl Llewellyn's point when he
observed, in his now famous article, that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point.' '0 8 Few have taken issue with Llewellyn's
observation. Indeed, it has been almost universally adopted as the starting place for all criticism of canons." 9 This canonical dilemma is
pointed to by a 1998 New York Court of Appeals case, Majewski v.
Broadalbin-PerthCentral School DistricdlW in which the juxtaposition
of opposing canons demonstrates the need for more specific analysis. 6'
The court writes:
It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that retroactive operation is not favored by courts and statutes will not be
given such construction unless the language expressly or by
necessary implication requires it. An equally settled maxim is
that "remedial" legislation or statutes governing procedural
matters should be applied retroactively.6 2
Secondly, viewed individually, many canons are wrong and equally
flawed. Canons are considered presumptions about legislative intent. 63
How, for example, do we know as a general proposition that when a
legislature passes a remedial statute that it intends for it to be broadly
applied? It is just as probable that the enacting legislature intends the
statute to be moderately or narrowly applied. The point is that, as a rule,
the canon bars the inquiry, and is at odds with legislative supremacy by
forcing the burden on the legislature to overcome a judicial presumption, rather than requiring the court to dig for the meaning.
Several years ago, Judge Mikva and I wrote: "[Despite t]his tide of
scholarly criticism ....

Canons ... continue to provide judges (and

consequently attorneys) with a necessary rationale for making interpretive choices." '64 Recent New York jurisprudence seems to be at odds
158. Llewellyn, supra note 155, at 401.
159. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom,50 U. CHu. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983).
The usual criticism of the canons ... is that for every canon one might bring to
bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon, so that the outcome of the interpretive process depends on the choice between paired opposites-a choice the canons
themselves do not illuminate. (You need a canon for choosing between competing canons, and there isn't any.)
Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, considers certain canons valuable aids to
the construction of statutes. See ScAuiA, supra note 30, at 25-27.
160. 696 N.E.2d 978 (N.Y. 1998).

161. See id. at 980.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. See MucvA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supranote 8, at 22.
164. Id. at 27.
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with this conclusion. Of the many cases reviewed for this article few
even used canons. In fact, in at least three cases, Karlin v. IVF America,
Inc.,'6 s Rust v. Reyer, 66 and Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Howard,67 the
court, given opportunities to apply canons to resolve a dispute, rejected
a canonical approach in favor of a more analytical one employing, for
example, legislative history and the statute's historical context.16
In 1VF America, Inc., the court reversed an appellate division decision that was based on a version of the canon that statutes in derogation
of the common law should be read narrowly, thus holding that both the
plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history suggested a
broader construction.169 A direct statement of this approach is found in
Reyer, in which the court determined that a statute outlawing the
"furnishing" of alcohol to a minor covered a defendant who allowed his
home to be used for a party at which alcohol was knowingly served."'
The defendant had nothing to do with the alcohol.' The decision overturned an appellate decision holding that the statute's reach was not this
broad on the basis of the canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed. 7 Confronted with legislative
history that suggested a broader purpose, the court stated: "[W]e are
mindful that a statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed. We are mindful as well that our prime directive, in matters of
statutory interpretation, is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature."'' Finally, in Village of Chestnut Ridge, as discussed earlier, 4 the
court pushed aside a canon ("all sections of a law should be read together") for what it considered a contrary legislative intent.'75
In a fourth case, Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Central School
District,16 the court, faced with the interpretation of the statutory phrase

165. 712N.E.2d662 (N.Y. 1999).
166. 693 N.E.2d 1074 (N.Y. 1998).
167. 708 N.E.2d 988 (N.Y. 1999).
168. Whether New York will go as far as the State of Oregon by formally stating its preference for legislative history remains to be seen. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor and
Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Or. 1993). ("If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear
from the text and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative history ....
).
169. See IVFAmerica, Inc., 712 N.E.2d at 666.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Rust, 693 N.E.2d at 1076-77.
See id. at 1075.
See id.
Id. at 1076-77 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.

175. See Howard,708 N.E.2d at 990.

176. 696 N.E.2d 978 (N.Y. 1998).
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"'to take effect immediately,"' rejected two competing canons.'77 After
finding that the phrase was contextually unclear and noting the applicability of certain canons,"' the court declared: "'General principles
may serve as guides in the search for the intention of the Legislature in
a particular case but only where better guides are not available'.... To
that end, we turn to legislative history to steer our analysis."'79 Interestingly, after an unavailing review of the legislative history, the court did
turn to one of the canons noted above, declaring: "That a statute is to be
applied prospectively is strongly presumed and here, we find nothing
that approaches any type of 'clear' expression of legislative intent concerning retroactive application."' 80
In only two other cases, Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.8' and
Foley v. Bratton,8 did the court rely on a canon of interpretation, and in
both cases the same canon-facially conflicting statutes must be83applied
"in the manner that will harmonize and further their purposes."'
C. Legislative History
The New York Court of Appeals relies heavily on legislative history in its search for the meaning of unclear statutes.' 4 Given the Court
of Appeals' aversion to canons, this reliance is not surprising. New
York's embrace of legislative history facially sustains two views in the
177. See id. at 980 (rejecting the canons "retroactive operation is not favored by courts and
...will not be ...[invoked] ...unless the language expressly or by necessary implication requires it" and "'remedial' legislation or statutes governing procedural matters should be applied
retroactively") (citations omitted).
178. See id. "It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that retroactive operation is
not favored by courts ....An equally settled maxim is that 'remedial' legislation or statutes governing procedural matters should be applied retroactively .....
Id.
179. Id. at 980-81 (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 984. This is the same canon used by the Supreme Court in Landgrafv. USI Filn
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994), to resolve a question concerning the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
181. 703 N.E.2d 246 (N.Y. 1998).
182. 709 N.E.2d 100 (N.Y. 1999).
183. Whalen, 703 N.E.2d at 249. According to the court in Foley: "It is not the function of the
court, however, to declare one statute the victor over another if the statutes may be read together,
without misdirecting the one, or breaking the spirit of the other." Foley, 709 N.E.2d at 102.
184. See, e.g., People v. Mateo, 712 N.E.2d 692, 694 (N.Y. 1999); People v. Owusu, 712
N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (N.Y. 1999); Karlin v. IVF America, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 662, 665-66 (N.Y.
1999); Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady, 710 N.E.2d 1072, 1075-76 (N.Y. 1999); McCall
v. Barrios-Paoli, 710 N.E.2d 671, 675-76 (N.Y. 1999); People v. Allen, 703 N.E.2d 1229, 1233
(N.Y. 1998); Maldonado v. Maryland Rail Commuter Serv. Admin., 695 N.E.2d 700, 702 (N.Y.
1998); Bast v. Rossoff, 697 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (N.Y. 1998); Myers v. Bartholomew, 697 N.E.2d
160, 163-64 (N.Y. 1998); Rust v. Reyer, 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (N.Y. 1998); Judge Rotenberg
Educ. Ctr. v. Maul, 693 N.E.2d 200,203 (N.Y. 1998).
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national academic debate over the use of legislative history, occasioned
by Justice Antonin Scalia's unnaturally striking refusal to ever refer to
it.' The first is that the use of legislative history is natural. If the judicial task is to find legislative meaning and the statute is unclear, legislative history, more than any other source, may provide the required clues
to legislative meaning. As Justice Stephen Breyer has written: "Using
legislative history to help interpret unclear statutory language seems
helps a court understand the context and
natural. Legislative history
t 6
purpose of a statute."'
The second view sustained by the Court of Appeals is that reference to legislative history is consistent with constitutional principles because probative legislative history is a formal part of the legislative
process and is seen as such within the process. This view is well expressed by Judge Patricia M. Wald:
For all its imperfections, legislative history, in the form of
committee reports, hearings, and floor remarks, is available to
courts because Congress has made those documents available to
us.... As Justice Scalia has recognized, there does indeed exist
a congressional practice of including information in legislative
history for the purpose, among others, of informing later judicial construction of the statute. But, to the extent that Congress
performs its responsibilities through committees and delegates
to staff the writing of its reports, it is Congress' evident intention that an explanation of what it has done be obtained from
these extrinsic materials.... [L]egislative history is the
authoritative product of the institutional work of the Congress.
It records the manner in which Congress enacts its legislation,

185. See, e.g., ScALiA,supra note 30, at 29-30 ("[L]egislative history should not be used as
an authoritative indication of a statute's meaning."); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 19192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen ...are frail substitutes for bicameral vote[s] upon the text of a law and its
presentment to the President."). In Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989), Justice Scalia, in a
concurring opinion, noted:
As anyone [who is] familiar with modem-day drafting of [a] congressional committee
report[] is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee
staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at
the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primadly to inform the Members of Congress what the bill meant ....
Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
186. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.CAL.
L. REV. 845, 848 (1991).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V7ol. 28:85

and it represents the way Congress communicates with the
country at large '87
Legislative history is effectively the formally documented steps
through which a bill is enacted into law. Such a history might include
the bill or bills through which the statute was introduced, the transcript
of introductory remarks, memoranda that accompanies such introduction, the record of a bill's assignment to committee, transcripts of
committee hearings, debates and markup sessions, amendments, committee votes, and committee reports (which normally contain a statement of a bill's purpose and scope, a statement of the reasons for which
a bill should be enacted, a section by section analysis, a statement of
changes the bill would make in existing law, committee amendments to
the bill, votes taken in committee, and a minority report setting forth
reasons for opposition to the bill)."'8 A legislative history might also
contain transcripts of debates, floor amendments, votes, conference
committee reports, and signing or veto statements.'89 Not all pieces of
legislative history are equally probative. For a piece of legislative history to be probative of legislative intent, it must bear a significant relationship to the enactment process. Such a relationship may be evidenced
by two types of legislative history. First, a legislator's statements that
are central to the actual debate over the bill. Professor Stephen F. Ross
suggests two such categories of statements:
(1) statements by the sponsor of the legislation or the particular
provision at issue when it appears that members who might otherwise desire to amend the bill have relied on those statements;
and (2) colloquies between the "major players" concerning a
legislative provision when it appears that the majority of members are prepared to follow any consensus reached by these individuals.'9

187. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 306
(1990) (footnotes omitted); see Breyer, supra note 186, at 858-61; James J. Brudney, Congres-

sional Commentary on JudicialInterpretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatteror Telling Response?, 93
MICH. L. REv. 1, 37-38 (1994); Charles Tiefer, InstitutionalLegislative History in the Supreme
Court, 1, 24-25 (on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History

and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,76
VA. L. REV. 1295, 1364-65 (1990).
188. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 27.
189. See id. at28.
190. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 561, 576 (1992).
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Second, the formal products of legislative institutions established by
Congress and other legislative bodies to effect the level of specialization
necessary to effect that legislature's legislative goals. Such products,
characterized by Professor Charles Tiefer as institutional legislative
history, would include committee and conference committee reports."'
About such legislative history, Professor Edward Correia has aptly
noted: "We should assume that legislators want courts to consider primarily statements that are adopted by the majority or that represent explanations by legislators with specialized responsibility for enactment."'92 Clearly uncovered by these definitions of probative legislative
history are post-passage signing statements by legislators or others. This
includes executive signing statements. "While the President has the
power to veto a bill and the legislature has the power to override the
veto, the legislature has no power to veto or override the executive's
signing message, which can contain any statement the executive
chooses to include."' 193
Despite New York's embrace of legislative history, its definition
and use vary substantially from the above model. Its temporal focus is
almost entirely on the executive signing period which includes the ten
day period after the legislature presents the passed bill to the Governor." 4 During this period the practice is for the Counsel to the Governor
to gather comments on the bill from executive agencies and groups affected by the legislation.9 " These comments are placed in a bill jacket
along with the bill itself.'96 In New York this bill jacket becomes the
central repository of a bill's history."9 Sometimes a bill jacket will contain a letter or memorandum from a legislator or legislatively generated
documents such as introductory memoranda.' 98 Basically though, almost
all materials contained in bill jackets are executively generated post

191. See Tiefer, supra note 187, at 28 (drawing on the work of Justice Breyer and the decisions by Justices Breyer and Stevens).
192. Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W.
RES.L. REV. 1129,1157 (1992).
193. MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8,at 40.

194. See N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
195.

See ROBERT ALLAN CARTER, LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN NEW YORK STATE 7(1981).

196. See ELLEN M. GIBSON, NEW YORK LEGAL RESEARCH GuiDE 1-97 (2d ed. 1998).
197. See id. ("While bill jackets do not contain a record of debate, a transcript of any hearings
or any committee reports of the sort available as a matter of course for federal legislation, no New
York legislative history search is complete without them."). But see CARTER, supra note 195, at 8
("A second misconception.., is that the Governor's bill jacket is the sole repository for legislative
intent. ...IThis is not always true.").

198. See CARTER, supranote 195, at 8.
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passage documents.'" This means that almost none of that which is referred to as legislative history in New York is institutional legislative
history or even legislatively generated legislative history. Rather, it is
almost all postfacto statements by interested parties on the meaning of
a statute.
Judicial attention to this executive-legislative history is well illustrated by the Fumarellidecision noted earlier."O
The Bill Jacket materials include two memoranda presented
for the Governor's consideration, when he approved the bill to
become law, that are also useful to the interpretative work of the
courts. ... The first, presented by the Attorney-General, states
that "the bill confirms the recent New York Court of Appeals
decision in Caceci." It adds that "[t]his bill affords important
legislative recognition, for the first time, of the existence of an
implied 'housing merchant' quality warranty. Further, it defines
the basic contours of this warranty."
The Executive Deputy Secretary of State also submitted a
support memorandum from that consumer-sensitive and regulatory entity. It states that "[t]he bill is a legislative reaction to
Caceci" and that it "also recognizes the housing merchant warranty." This memorandum, like the Attorney-General's, reflects
an expectation of a statutory regimen providing definitive governance and direction to contracting parties and creating a uniform universe within which they could rely. 0'
2 2 demonstrates
Similarly, a 1999 case, McCall v. Barrios-Paoli,
the same approach.

The history of the statutes, moreover, unambiguously demonstrates that the Legislature expected the State Comptroller
might conduct audits into the effective use of State funds by
political subdivisions. In signing the 1971 amendments to the
General Municipal Law that added New York City (as well as
Buffalo and Rochester) to the statute's reporting and auditing
requirements, for example, the Governor noted that "[u]niform
Statewide audits of all levels of local government required by
the bill can provide a great contribution to efficient and economic administration and use of the taxpayers' dollar." As the

199.
200.
201.
202.

See GMSON, supra note 196, atl-97.
703 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 1998); See supra notes 25 & 27 and accompanying text.
Fumarelli,703 N.E.2d at 254-55 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
710 N.E.2d 671 (N.Y. 1999).
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Governor had observed in seeking that legislation, "sixty-three
cents of every tax dollar [the State collects] goes back to the local governments to help them meet their responsibilities," and it
is the State's responsibility to see "that performance standards
set by the Legislature in connection with * * * State-supported
services are lived up to by local government." The Division of
the Budget, in recommending that the Governor sign the bill,
echoed the sentiment that the Comptroller's audits would enable
the State to fulfill its "responsibility to insure [sic] the efficient
and effective use" of the City's funds and "help promote efficiency in their financial administration." 3
Such executive-legislative history is not limited to gubernatorial
signing statements or statements of executive officials. Also included
within such history are the comments of other governmental officials
and lobbyists and the post-passage comments of legislators. For example, in the earlier discussed Council of New York v. Giuliani,2 the court
found that "[t]he legislative intent was perhaps best captured in a letter
written by Mayor Lindsay: [which] ....indicated that 'the health care
system [was to] continue to be the City's responsibility." ' 2°5 And in
People v. Allen,2 ° the court was asked to determine whether an attempt
to solicit small amounts of marihuana from undercover police, who
were actually selling oregano, constituted "criminal solicitation" under
the Penal Code or came under a statutory exemption.2 ' After determining that the applicability of the criminal solicitation provision of the Penal Law statute to solicitors of small amounts of marihuana was unclear,
the court found that the solicitation was exempt from the sanction because the intent of a subsequently enacted statute which, according to
practice commentaries, was to "'reduce the penalties for possession and
sale of marihuana and in particular to "decriminalize" the possession of
a small amount of marihuana for personal use.' 3 Finally, in Myers v.
Bartholomew,2°9 in deciding a particularly difficult question regarding
time periods for adverse possession in certain circumstances, the court

203. Id. at 675-76 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
204. 710 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1999); See supranotes 126-30 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 259 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
206. 703 N.E.2d 1229 (N.Y. 1998).
207. See id. at 1231.
208. Id. at 1233; see also Maldonado v. Maryland Rail Commuter Serv. Admin., 695 N.E.2d
700, 702 (N.Y. 1998) (examining the legislative intent of Civil Practice Law & Rules ("CPLR")
§ 205, the court looked to a Bar Association report pertaining to CPLR § 306-b(b), a related section of the statute).
209. 697 N.E.2d 160 (N.Y. 1998).
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referred to a memorandum from the Senate Minority Leader, as well as
memoranda from the Law Revision Commission and from the Bar Association of the City of New York.2 0 Other similar sources cited by the
court were memoranda of the Police Conference and a special prosecutor,21' and a memorandum from the New York Law Enforcement
Council.212
Of the cases reviewed for this Article, few made reference (and
none exclusively) to what is apparently pre-passage legislatively generated legislative history. Included in this history were memoranda from
individual legislators, 213 a sponsor's memorandum,2 14 a legislative debate,25 a legislative budget report,2 6 a legislative memorandum, 217 and a
legislator's floor declarations. 218 It is not clear whether the legislators'
memoranda were prepared for the enactment process or executive signing process. Indeed, save for Majewski,2 9 the court neither places the
referred to legislative history in the enactment process nor provides any
analytical framework for evaluating legislative history, appearing to
treat all pieces of legislative history equally or, based on the slimness of
any legislative record in New York, as substantively meaningless.
In Majewski, the court did attempt to provide some analytical
framework for understanding its approach to legislative history and
other tools of construction.
It is clear that one of the key purposes of the Act was the
legislative modification of Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. insofar as
that case related to third-party actions against employers. That
intention was repeatedly expressed by all sides during the legislative debates and is included in the official statement of intent....
210. Seeid.at 163, 164.
211. See Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady, 710 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (N.Y. 1999). The
Police Conference is a nonprofit corporation composed of police officer's associations which lobbies in an effort to influence the outcome of pending legislation. See Police Conference of New
York v. Kreutzer, 91 A.D.2d 735,735 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
212. People v. Wilder, 93 N.Y.2d 352, 359 (1999). The New York Law Enforcement Council
is "an umbrella group of law enforcement agencies throughout New York State." People v. Garcia,
161 Misc. 2d 1, 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
213. See Daily Gazette Co., 710 N.E.2d at 1075, 1076 (citing individual Senators and Assembly members); Rust v. Reyer 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (N.Y. 1998) (citing Letter of Assembly-

member John F. Duane).
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See People v. Romero, 698 N.E.2d 424,427-28 (N.Y. 1998).
See People v. Mateo, 712 N.E.2d 692, 694 (N.Y. 1999).
See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr. v. Maul, 693 N.E.2d 200, 202 (N.Y. 1998).
See People v. Stevens, 692 N.E.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. 1998).
See Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist., 696 N.E.2d 978, 981 (N.Y. 1998).
See id. at 982-84.
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With the recent passage of the Act, the Legislature endeavored
to clarify and restore "the force of 'exclusive remedy' (or 'no
fault') provisions. Specifically, amendments would protect employers and their employees from other than contract-based
suits for contribution or indemnity by third parties (such as
equipment manufacturers which have been deemed liable for
causing employees injuries or deaths)-in effect, repealing the
doctrine of Dole."
Memoranda issued contemporaneously with the passing and
signing of the Act provided that "the exclusive remedy" would
be "restored and reinforced." In an analysis of retroactive application, we have found it relevant when the legislative history
reveals that the purpose of new legislation is to clarify what the
law was always meant to say and do. However, labeling the
legislation as "remedial" in this regard is not dispositive in light
of other indicators of legislative intent.
For example, legislators made declarations during floor debates that conclusively state that the Act was not intended to be
applied retroactively. Moreover, a report entitled "New York
State Assembly Majority Task Force on Workers' Compensation Reform" explicitly states that the provisions would apply
only to "accidents that occur [after the effective] date forward,"
and was "not intended to limit the rights of parties to a lawsuit
filed after the law takes effect, but involving a claim arising
from an accident that occurred before the law took effect." Although these averments "may be accorded some weight in the
absence of more definitive manifestations of legislative purpose", such indicators of legislative intent must be cautiously
used....
On the same footing are statements contained in the Governor's Memorandum issued with the signing of the Act. In it, the
Governor states his view that the legislation was intended to be
retroactive....
Although postenactment statements of the Governor may be
examined in an analysis of legislative intent and statutory purpose, such statements suffer from the same infirmities as those
made during floor debates by legislators. Here, the reports and
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memoranda simply indicate that various people had various
views. [FN2]
[FN]2. Under the circumstances, little weight should be
accorded to the postpassage opinions of the Department
of Insurance and the Workers' Compensation Board
concerning the reach of the legislation.
Importantly, we note that the initial draft of the Act expressly
provided that it would apply to "lawsuits [that have] neither
been settled nor reduced to judgment" by the date of its enactment. That language does not appear in the enacted version. A
court may examine changes made in proposed legislation to
determine intent. Here, such evidence is consistent with the
strong presumption of prospective application in the absence of
a clear statement concerning retroactivity."
It is hard to gauge the significance of this decision, as it is not mentioned again in other subsequent cases.
The New York Court of Appeals' attention to executive-legislative
history is problematic. Simply put, if the bill is not vetoed, it allows a
statute's meaning to be shaped without legislative participation. The
court's attention to executive-legislative history does not appear to reflect a purposeful favoring of executive perspectives, nor a judicial intemperance for legislative lawmaking, nor ignorance of the legislative
process. Rather, such attention results from the fact that the New York
State Legislature produces almost no legislative history. As Judge Kaye
has politely observed: "I]n New York ...legislative history is relatively sparse with legislative intent evidenced primarily by the language
of the statute itself."' ' A less circumspect observation might be that the
leadership-dominated New York legislative process is conducted almost
entirely in closed nonrecorded forums. While it does produce bills,
some introductory memoranda, votes, and transcripts of debates the debates are meaningless because the passage of every bill on a house floor
in unamended form is preordained. More importantly, for legislative
history purposes, New York Legislature's committee system is moribund. As I have written elsewhere:
In healthy legislative bodies ...committees do much of the
heavy lifting. They introduce legislation, debate it, amend it in

220. Id. at 981-82 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
221. Kaye, supranote 1, at 30.
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markup sessions, hear the opinions of outside experts and the
public... describing their intent [in reports] ....

Such a division of labor, and authority, is largely unknown in
Albany. As a former legislative staffer has neatly summarized
the Legislature's committee life: "Nothing ever happens. A
leadership-created agenda is followed and bills are voted on,
always favorably. No debates or markup sessions are held, no
amendments permitted. Nothing except votes are recorded." m
Against that background the court is essentially faced with the choice of
declaring its view of what the law ought to be, or to search for some
outside source contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute in
question which sheds some light on the statute. And it is on executivelegislative history that the court most often relies.
VI.

SHOWDOWN QUESTIONS

Even under New York's very broad definition, legislative history
does not provide the answer to many cases. Nor should it be given the
erratic and non-probative nature of most of the material found in bill
jackets. This means that many of the cases resolved by the Court of Appeals are what Professor Harry W. Jones has characterized as a "'serious
business' situationf_" or "show-down question," tm -one for which
statutory sources or legislative procedures cannot provide an answer and
yet the court must.2 4 It is in these cases that the court must "speak the
language of the common law. ' ' 2mAs Judge Kaye has said about this type
of case: "I think it clear that common-law courts interpreting statutes
and filling the gaps have no choice but to 'make law' in circumstances
where neither the statutory text nor the 'legislative will' provides a single clear answer."2 6 The court is not always explicit in this endeavor.
Many of the cases in which legislative history of any type is noted seem
more the product of "interstitial common-law adjudication,"' 7 than ju222. Eric Lane, Albany's Travesty of Democracy, CrrYJ., Spring 1997, at 49, 50.
223. See Harry W. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence,74 COLuM. L. REv. 1023, 1041
(1974). The phrase "serious business" is drawn from Justice Cardozo: "It is when the colors do not
match, when the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent, that the serious
business of the judge begins." BENJAMIN N. CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcIAL PROCESS 21
(1921).
224. See MIKVA & LANE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at 41; Jones, supra
note 223, at 1041.
225. Kaye, supranote 1, at 20.
226. Id. at 33-34.
227. People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731,735 (N.Y. 1998).
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dicial deference to legislative meaning as expressed through legislative

history of any type.m
Sometimes, on the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals will

lay its cards on the table and signal that it is faced with a show-down
question and basically confront it head on. One example of such an endeavor is Mowczan v. Bacon.29 In that case, the court was asked to resolve a third-party practice question of whether the primary defendant,

the owner and operator of a tractor trailer in which the plaintiff was a
passenger, could implead the owner of the trailer portion of the vehicle
with which defendants' tractor-trailer coflided.20 The answer depended

upon the interpretation of a particular provision of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law.2' The court stated:
Partly because of the temporal misalignment of enactments
affecting the question here, we are charged with trying to dis-

cover and discern the intent of the Legislature in enacting a
statute in 1924 (and subsequently recodifying it in 1929 and
1959) as it meets a separate species of statute that emerged only
in 1974 from the common-law cocoon of Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co.....
The Legislature in the early decades of this century did not
foresee or provide for the circumstance that the courts, by

common-law evolvements, would alter liability standards with a
more progressive fairness distribution....
228. This is consistent with another of Professor Jones' observations:
Why is it so hard to tell, on a first reading of the court's opinion in a "serious business" case, that the controversy was originally a stand-off, as concerns formal legal
doctrine, and was decided as it was chiefly in accordance with the court's viewsinformed judgment, intuitive impression or largely unconscious predilection, depending
on judge or judges involved-of what is sound public policy? The source of the analytical difficulty is in the syllogistic form characteristic of judicial opinions, which operates, as often as not, to obscure policy decision in a wrapping of essentially secondary
doctrinal explanations. For courts must not only reach decisions, they also have to justify them, and, as John Dewey wrote a long time ago, there is always danger that the
logic of justification will overpower and conceal the logic of search and inquiry by
which a decision was actually arrived at.
Jones, supra note 223, at 1041.
229. 703 N.E.2d 242 (N.Y. 1998); see also People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 734 (N.Y.
1998) (indicating that the resolution of statutory standing required the synthesis of provisions in
the CPL, the CPLR and the Penal Law); Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 703 N.E.2d 246, 247
(N.Y. 1998) (noting that the reduction of Plaintiff's verdict would have to be determined by the
comparative fault provisions of CPLR 1411 or by the settlement set-off rule codification in General Obligations Law section 15-108(a)).
230. See Mowczan, 703 N.E.2d at 243.
231. See id. (analyzing § 388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law).
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Not surprisingly, this effort by human agents in all branches
of government to effect a scheme of comprehensive symmetry
left interstices. The language of the preexisting Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 388 neither precludes nor authorizes the remedy
of third-parties to seek contribution pursuant to it under circumstances such as are presented here. The question this Court
faces, therefore, is whether the overarching policy of CPLR
1401 should fill the gap of this permutation in third-party practice, unimagined as of the time of enactment of the predecessor
to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. We think it should.3 2
An exemplar of common decision making within a statutory
framework, but from an earlier term, is Braschi v. Stahl Associates
Co.2 3' In Braschi, New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, was
required to interpret the term "family" in a rent-control statute.' 4 The
statute regulated the amount of rent that could be charged for certain
apartments and the landlord's right to evict tenants3 5 Braschi had lived
with another man, Leslie Blanchard, in a rent-controlled apartment.2
Their lives were completely socially and economically intertwined and
both considered the apartment they lived in their home. 7 However, at
the time of Blanchard's death, the lease was still in Blanchard's name. 8
Under the statute, if Braschi was a member of Blanchard's family, he
could not be evicted from the apartment; if he was not, he could be.2 9
The statute contained no definition of the term family nor was one discernible from the statute's legislative history.= Also, as the plurality
pointed out, the dictionary allowed for both definitions of family.2 1 ' For
example, according to Webster's Dictionary, "family" could be defined
as: (1) "all the people living in the same house" or (2) "a social unit
consisting of parents and [their] children." 22 The purpose for which the
statute was enacted was, as the court agreed, indisputable. 3 The act was
passed both to protect a narrow group of occupants, "familial" tenants,
from eviction and to gradually return rent control apartments to the free
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 244-45.
543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
See id. at 50.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 50.
See id. at 55.
See 1d. at 51.
See id. at 52.
See id.
See id. at 54.
WBSTER's NEW WORLD DICIONARY 489 (3d ed. 1991).
See Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54.
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market.2' Based on the above, for a majority of the court, as declared by

Judge Bellacosa in a concurring opinion, the "legislative intent [was]
completely indecipherable."' The court opted for the broader definition, protecting Braschi's tenancy.26 In doing so a plurality of the court
wrote:
[W]e conclude that the term family, as used in [the statute],

should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage
certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection against
sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or
genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the
reality of family life.247
VII.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS

In New York, as throughout the nation, a frequent task of the
courts is the review of the interpretation of statutes by administrative
agencies. Agencies, like the courts, are required to follow the plain
meaning rule and the failure to do so is reversible by a court. 24' But over
at least the last two decades there has been a debate over the respective
roles of agencies and courts in the interpretation of an unclear statute.
On the federal level, that debate has been, at least in theory, resolved by
the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

244.
245.
246.
247.

See id.
Id. at 56 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
See id. at 54 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
Id. at 53. Judge Bellacosa, in concurrence, was clearly more circumspect:
The plurality opinion favors the petitioner's side by invoking the nomenclature of
"nuclear"/"normal"/"genuine" family versus the "traditional"/"legally recognizable"
family selected by the dissenting opinion in favor of the landlord. I eschew both polar
camps because I see no valid reason for deciding so broadly; indeed, there are cogent
reasons not to yaw towards either end of the spectrum.
...Traditionally, in such circumstances, generous construction is favored.

...We just do not know the answers or implications for an exponential number of varied fact situations, so we should do what courts are in the business of doing--deciding
cases as best they fallibly can. Applying the unvarnished regulatory word, "family", as
written, to the facts so far presented falls within a well-respected and long-accepted judicial method.
Id. at 56-57 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
248. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984) (claiming that courts can reverse agency decisions that are contrary to "clear congressional intent").
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fense Council, Inc.,249 which held that federal courts must defer to interpretations by the agencies to which Congress has delegated the power to
apply the statute."' The Court's reasoning is as follows:
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
... If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."'

State courts have generally not adopted the Chevron canon. While

state courts will give weight in various circumstances to agency inter249. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
250. See id. at 843-44.
251. Id. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted). This doctrine is not without its critics.
[S]uch a rule is quite appealing, especially when Congress has delegated lawinterpreting power to the agency or when the question involves the agency's specialized fact-finding and policymaking competence ....
For several reasons, however, a general rule of judicial deference to all agency interpretations of law would be unsound. The case for deference depends in the first instance on congressional instructions. If Congress has told courts to defer to agency interpretations, courts must do so. But many regulatory statutes were born out of
legislative distrust for agency discretion; they represent an effort to limit administrative
authority through clear legislative specifications. A rule of deference in the face of
ambiguity would be inconsistent with understandings, endorsed by Congress, of the
considerable risks posed by administrative discretion. An ambiguity is simply not a
delegation of law-interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 445
(1989) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official
with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretationand the Problem of Legislative History, 66
Ctri.-KENT L. REv. 321, 331-32 (1990) (claiming that although courts can invoke the delegation
doctrine when statutes are ambiguous, they often find other means of ensuring that agencies act
within the law).
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pretations of their enabling statutes, they tend to reserve to themselves,
in some form or another, the authority to impose their interpretations of
statutes which do not call for the application of an agency's particular
expertise. 2
New York has adopted this approach, sometimes choosing to defer
to reasonable agency interpretations, and other times choosing to reverse them. This is good news because a blanket rule of deference is inconsistent with a search for legislative meaning. As Professor Cass R.
Sunstein has accurately observed:
The case for deference depends in the first instance on congres-

sional instructions. If Congress has told courts to defer to
agency interpretations, courts must do so. But many regulatory
statutes were born out of legislative distrust for agency discretion; they represent an effort to limit administrative authority

through clear legislative specifications. A rule of deference in
the face of ambiguity would be inconsistent with understandings, endorsed by Congress, of the considerable risks posed by

administrative discretion. An ambiguity is simply not a delega-

tion of law-interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two." 3

This appears to be the New York approach despite a number of cases in
which deference to agency interpretation is noted and followed. Agency
deference is exemplified by Nunez v. Guiliani. Faced with a question

concerning an agency's narrow interpretation of the phrase "eligibility
date," the court declared that "'[a]n administrative regulation will be

upheld only if it has a rational basis, and is not unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious."'

5

"On the other hand, '[t]he challenger must establish

that a regulation "is so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is
' ' 6
essentially arbitrary...'
2
An example of the court reserving interpretive

252. See generally ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASiMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9.2 (1989) (discussing the scope of review that federal and state courts
use for issues of legal interpretation).
253. Sunstein, supra note 251, at 445 (footnotes omitted).
254. 693 N.E.2d 746 (N.Y. 1998); see also Golf v. New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 697
N.E.2d 555, 560 (N.Y. 1998) ("[G]iven the fundamental ambiguity of the relevant statutory provisions, deference is appropriately given to the State agency's interpretation in this case."); Village
of Scarsdale v. Jorling, 695 N.E.2d 1113, 1117 (N.Y. 1998) (quoting Harris & Assocs. v. deLeon,
646 N.E.2d 438, 442 (N.Y. 1994)) ("'[T]he practical construction of the statute by the agency
charged with implementing it, if not unreasonable, is entitled to deference by the courts."').
255. Nunez, 693 N.E.2d at 747 (quoting New York State Ass'n of Counties v. Axelrod, 577
N.E.2d 16,20 (N.Y. 1991)).
256. Id. at 747-48 (quoting Axelrod, 577 N.E.2d at 20-21 (quoting Marburg v. Cole, 36
N.E.2d 113, 117 (N.Y. 1941))) (alteration in original).
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authority to themselves is Seittelman v. SaboL27 In Seittelman, the court
overruled an agency's narrow interpretation of a statute providing for
Medicaid reimbursement, in certain cases, for medical services rendered
prior to an individual's application to the program. 21
It is settled law that an agency's interpretation of the statutes
it administers must be upheld absent demonstrated irrationality
or unreasonableness. However, where the "question is one of
pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate
apprehension of legislative intent, there is little basis to rely on
any special competence or expertise of the administrative
agency." In such a case, courts are "free to ascertain the proper
interpretation from the statutory language and legislative intenL 9
VIII. SETTLING THE LAW
One of the most noticeable things about the New York Court of
Appeals is the extent to which the court renders unanimous decisions in
cases involving clear or unclear statutes. Of the cases reviewed for this
article thirty-nine were unanimous, two had one dissenter and none had
more than one dissenter. There seems to be a conscious effort on the
part of the court to distill cases to elements on which all members can
agree in order that the court may at least appear to serve the law rather
than make it. As Judge Kaye has written: "Indeed, on our court we especially strive for consensus in statutory interpretation cases as a matter
of policy."26
IX. CONCLUSION
Justice Antonin Scalia has recently complained about the absence
of a theory of statutory interpretation, under which objective standards
for determining the meaning of a statute presumably could be extracted.
"Surely this is a sad commentary. We American judges have no intelligible theory of what we do most."' And to make matters worse, the

257. 697 N.E.2d 154, 157 (N.Y. 1998); see also New York Botanical Garden v. Board of
Standards and Appeals of N.Y., 694 N.E.2d 424, 426 (N.Y. 1998) (explaining that where the
question is one of pure legal interpretation of statutory terms, deference to the Board of Standards
and Appeals is not required).
258. Seittelman, 697 N.E.2d at 157.
259. Id. (internal citations omitted).
260. Kaye, supra note 1,at 23.
261. ScAuA, supra note 30, at 14.
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"American bar and American legal education, by and large, are unconcerned with the fact that we have no intelligible theory."262 As an answer
to his perceived dilemma, he posits textualism-the use of the text and,
if unclear, the use of certain canons that address the logic of language,
such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius,noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.23 But the signature piece of his theory is the self conscious
avoidance of legislative history.
New York jurisprudence demonstrates the weakness of both his
observation and theory. Indeed New York does have an intelligible theory of statutory interpretation, but its applicability is limited by the
number of cases in which legislative meaning is simply undeterminable,
except through common law decision making. In these cases, the court
has no choice but to adopt what Justice Scalia sarcastically labels a "Mr.
Fix-it mentality." No text based theory, like Scalia's, or text and process based theory, like mine, can avoid the problem. But even in those
cases, the New York Court of Appeals appears to extend itself to reach a
consensus in order to guard against the contentious political decision
making often found on the Supreme Court.
New York's theory does provide for the use of legislative history.
As with all courts, its impressment for determining meaning is so natural that its avoidance would seem odd. The court's particular use of
legislative history is somewhat problematic. First, it uses it in support of
clear text, an unnecessary and potentially dangerous practice. Second,
the legislative history it uses is most often executive-legislative history
because of the dearth of legislatively-generated history. But, contrary to
Justice Scalia's view, this use of executive, legislative history allows the
court to avoid judicial lawmaking, not to cover for it.
On balance, despite the richness of its common law tradition,2 6 the
New York Court of Appeals is a court that seems comfortable with its
constitutional obligation to honor legislative efforts and to limit its own
lawmaking efforts to cases in which answers can only be found through
such efforts.

262. Id. at 14.
263. See id. at 25-26.
264. Id. at 14.
265.

See, e.g., FRANCIS BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 1847-

1932 (1985).
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